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association and firm performance from 1998 to 2002. Their results showed that group firms were larger in size, had lower sales growth variability and a higher operating profitability in comparison to non-group firms. 2.2 Family Ownership and Firm Performance Family ownership has several theoretical advantages. First, management of family firms There is reason to believe that family ownership is affected by firm performance to some extent, because the controlling family may retain control only of firms with favorable prospects. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) argue that the market succeeds in bringing forth ownership structures that are close to optimal. They suggest that ownership structures are firms Founding-Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidencefromthe S&P 500 RONALDC. ANDERSONand DAVIDM. REEBn ABSTRACT We investigate the relation between founding-family ownership and ¢rm per-formance.We ¢nd that familyownershipisbothprevalent and substantial; fa-milies are present in one-third of the S&P 500 and account for 18 percent of The effects of family ownership on firm performance have received increased attention over the last two decades, without any conclusive results (Schulze and Gedajlovich, 2010 amongst others). The issue is particularly relevant in Italy, since family firms have considerable importance in the economy and family control is the dominant form of ownership. Furthermore, this governance structure - Using the panel data of 465 Taiwanese listed companies and taking into consideration endogeneity issues this paper aims to examine the influence of family ownership on firm performances., - The use of a panel data set encompassing a five‐year period enables one to examine both cross‐sectional and within‐firm variations in the relationships between family ownership and firm For the high ownership concentration group (>50%), the mean rho is significantly negative for the low-medium institutional quality sub-group and not significantly different from zero for the high institutional quality sub-group, indicating that highly concentrate family ownership does not benefit firm performance in emerging markets and can even be detrimental to firm performance when the quality of institutions is low. From these various comparisons, we conclude that, on average included in any index in their post-IPO years. The time series changes in family ownership allow us to estimate firm fixed effects regressions on the sample of family firm-years, which explicitly control for unobserved firm characteristics that could simultaneously explain family ownership retention and firm performance and policy. We follow The family ownership dummy equals one when one or more family members are officers or directors or own 5% or more of the firm's equity either individually or as a group. Family ownership stake is the percentage of shares of all classes held by the family as a group. Control-enhancing mechanisms is a dummy that equals one when there are multiple share classes, pyr